Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The CTBT
marks an historic milestone in America's efforts to reduce the
nuclear threat and build a safer world.
- The CTBT
will prohibit any nuclear explosion, whether for weapons or other
purposes.
- Halting
all nuclear explosions will constrain the development of more
sophisticated and destructive nuclear weapons.
- The CTBT
will thus help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote
nuclear disarmament, and enhance U.S. national security and that
of our friends and allies.
The CTBT
was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) between
January 1994 and August 1996. The United Nations General Assembly
voted on September 10, 1996, to adopt the Treaty by a vote of
158 in favor, 3 opposed, and 5 abstentions. President Clinton
was the first world leader to sign the CTBT on September 24, 1996.
151 other nations have now signed, and 41 have ratified. The Treaty
will enter into force following ratification by the United States
and 43 other CD member states with nuclear power and/or research
reactors. Twenty-one of these 44 states - almost half - have now
ratified. Failure by the Senate to provide its advice and consent
would prevent the entry into force of this important arms control
agreement.CTBT's Central Features
- Basic
obligations. The CTBT will ban any nuclear weapon test explosion
or any other nuclear explosion, consistent with President Clinton's
August 11, 1995, decision to negotiate a true zero yield CTBT.
- Organization.
The Treaty establishes an organization to ensure the implementation
of its provisions, including those for international verification
measures. The organization includes a Conference of States Parties,
an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat, which shall
include the International Data Center.
- Structure.
The Treaty includes a Protocol in three parts: Part I details
the International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site
Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence Building Measures.
There are two Annexes: Annex 1 details the location of treaty
monitoring assets associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 details
the parameters for screening events.
- Verification
and Inspections. The Treaty's verification regime includes an
international monitoring system composed of seismological, radionuclide,
hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification;
on-site inspections; and confidence building measures. The use
of national technical means, vital for the Treaty's verification
regime, is explicitly provided for. Requests for on-site inspections
must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of
the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. The Executive Council
must act within 96 hours of receiving a request for an inspection.
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- Treaty compliance
and sanctions. The Treaty provides for measures to redress a situation
and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement
of disputes. If the Conference or Executive Council determines that
a case is of particular gravity, it can bring the issue to the attention
of the United Nations.
- Amendments.
Any state party to the Treaty may propose an amendment to the
Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Amendments
will be considered by an Amendment Conference and will be adopted
by a positive vote of a majority of the States parties with no
State party casting a negative vote.
- Entry
into force. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the
date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States
listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, but in no case earlier than two
years after its opening for signature (i.e., September 24, 1998).
Annex 2 includes 44 States members of the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) with nuclear power and/or research reactors. If the Treaty
has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary
of its opening for signature (i.e., September 24, 1999), a conference
of the States that have already deposited their instruments of
ratification may convene annually to consider and decide by consensus
what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken
to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate
the early entry into force of this Treaty.
- Treaty compliance
and sanctions. The Treaty provides for measures to redress a situation
and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement
of disputes. If the Conference or Executive Council determines that
a case is of particular gravity, it can bring the issue to the attention
of the United Nations.
- Amendments.
Any state party to the Treaty may propose an amendment to the
Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Amendments
will be considered by an Amendment Conference and will be adopted
by a positive vote of a majority of the States parties with no
State party casting a negative vote.
- Entry
into force. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the
date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States
listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, but in no case earlier than two
years after its opening for signature (i.e., September 24, 1998).
Annex 2 includes 44 States members of the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) with nuclear power and/or research reactors. If the Treaty
has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary
of its opening for signature (i.e., September 24, 1999), a conference
of the States that have already deposited their instruments of
ratification may convene annually to consider and decide by consensus
what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken
to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate
the early entry into force of this Treaty.
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